The Prospective Component of Delayed Intention

The prospective component of delayed intention (or prospective memory task Opens in new window) includes retention interval, performance interval, initiation and execution of intended action, and evaluation of outcome. It includes also other relevant events, such as recollections, that occur during either retention or performance intervals.

The term recollection refers to occasions on which a delayed intention is remembered prior to the occurrence of a retrieval context during a performance interval.

Recollections of a delayed intention may be prompted by any one of variety of factors.

Some recollections may occur as a result of a direct or deliberate act that originates either form oneself (e.g., after noticing a previously planned memory such as a memo to oneself) or from another person (e.g., following a direct reminder from a colleague).

Others may occur with apparent “spontaneity,” in the absence of a direct or deliberate reminder.

These recollections — their occurrence and the frequency and rate at which they occur — may play a role in the eventual outcome of a delayed intention.

There is some indication, from laboratory tasks, that failures to carry out a delayed intention are associated both with a low frequency of recollections during a short (3- to 15-min.) retention interval and the absence of a recollection close to the appearance of a retrieval context during a performance interval (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990).

Kvavilashvili’s (1987) findings, moreover, suggest that the occurrence per se of a recollection during a short retention interval increases the likelihood of a successful outcome.

Studies of naturally occurring intentions, with much longer retention intervals (hours, days), indicate that the occurrence rather than the frequency of recollection is associated with success on these intentions (Ellis, 1988a, 1988b). The precise role of recollections in the performance of delayed intentions is as yet unknown.

One possibility is that they function as a means of refreshing or strengthening the content of the intention by, for example, increasing its activation level. If a recollection functions in this manner and it occurs close to a potential retrieval context, then it should increase the likelihood of selecting the intended action.

Recollections, therefore, within a comparatively brief retention interval would be expected to have — as empirical observations suggest — a beneficial effect on performance.

An alternate explanation is that delayed intentions (prospective memory) may be usefully classified as either shorter or longer term, and that each may rely on the operation of different processes.

They argued that shorter term tasks may have to be maintained in “conscious awareness” (p. 13) for the duration of a retention interval in order to ensure a successful outcome.

In a similar vein, Meacham and Leiman (1976) suggested that over brief retention intervals “remembering to carry out an action … may be no different than the problem of maintaining one’s vigilance or attention” (p. 328).

In contrast, McDaniel and Einstein (1993) argued that conscious awareness may be relevant only during a performance interval. They also suggested that its role may depend on the nature of a retrieval context:

It may be more critical for a time-based task than for an event-based one. There is some indication also that the character of a retention interval may be as important as its relative duration.

Recent research suggests that the nature of one’s activity, for example, may influence the recollection of both longer (Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993) and shorter term delayed intentions (Kvavilashvili, 1987), and the eventual outcome of shorter term ones (Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994).

It was suggested that classifications used to describe longer term (retrospective) memory, such as the episodic-semantic distinction (Tulving, 1972, 1983), may be usefully applied to prospective memory (Baddeley & Wilkins, 1984).

Baddeley and Wilkins pointed out that although many longer term delayed intentions are episodic (e.g., they refer to specific encoding events), they rely on accessing, activating, and executing action plans that are essentially semantic.

Ellis and Shallice (1993) argued that planning processes that operate on these action plans, particularly those toward retrieval at an appropriate moment (when-realization), also exert an important influence on performance.

These planning processes are thought to be highly dependent on and interactive with the representation of regularly executed routine-based actions and activities. An intention to visit a friend this evening, for example, may require rescheduling of one’s typical evening activities (dinner, walking the dog, etc.).

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